

The Social Basis of Taiwan's Liberalizing Cross-Strait Policies, 2008-2012

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Abstract:

This paper examines the social basis of China-related policies in Taiwan. Drawing on data from telephone surveys conducted during 2010, the project investigates Taiwanese people's attitudes towards various China-related policies, including (1) ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement), (2) allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan, (3) recognizing Chinese diplomas and degrees, (4) allowing self-guided individual Chinese tourists in Taiwan, and (5) increasing the daily quota of Chinese tourists on group tours in Taiwan. The study found that the Taiwanese people's stance towards diverse China-related policies varied and was indeed affected by their socio-political backgrounds. On the one hand, aged citizens, men in general, pan-blue supporters, and higher-income citizens were more likely to support Taiwan government's China-related policies; on the other hand, younger citizens, women in general, non-pan-blue supporters, and lower-income citizens tended towards non-supportive stances of the same policies. These divisions of opinion reflected the social impacts of rapidly changing cross-strait relations in Taiwan.

Key words: cross-strait relationship, China-related policies, Taiwan and China

Introduction

This study explores the social basis of Taiwan's cross-strait policies since 2010. It observes the various groups who support and/or reject particular cross-strait policies. More specifically, it examines how various factors like gender, ethnicity, social status, party identification, and national identity of Taiwanese influence the possibility of supporting or opposing particular cross-strait policies. These divisions of opinion reflect the social impact of rapidly changing cross-strait relationship in Taiwan.

Since the second alteration of the ruling party in 2008, Taiwan's relationship with China has significantly warmed. The two have signed nearly twenty trade and investment pacts, initiated direct cross-strait flights and made Taipei the first market outside Hong Kong able to clear *Renminbi* transactions. Thus, cross-strait relations have become the center of politics and the principal site of public disputes in Taiwan. Some Taiwanese would tend towards the view that boosting cross-strait trade and investment will positively drive Taiwan's economic growth, while others are perturbed that it will only exacerbate the hollowing out of Taiwan's manufacturing industry. In June 2010, the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) opened up deepening cross-strait ties in the fields of trade, finance, and commerce. Cultural, educational, and social exchanges have simultaneously followed. Two months later (August 2011), Taiwan's legislature passed a bill recognizing a total of 41 Chinese university degrees, and to allow Taiwan's universities and colleges to admit Chinese degree-seeking students. These events were a continuation of the June 2008 opening of Taiwan to Chinese tour groups, which has reached a daily quota of 4,000 Chinese citizens since the end of 2012. Earlier, the number of Chinese visitors to Taiwan increased from an average of 3,600 a day since the daily quota was raised from 3,000 to 4,000 in early 2011 with the stipulation that Chinese visitors to Taiwan should travel as part of organized groups. Then, from June

2011, a maximum of 500 individual tourists per day from three Chinese cities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen) were allowed to visit Taiwan. As of December 2012, thirteen Chinese cities have been approved to grant individual tourist visits to Taiwan, reaching an average daily number of 763 tourists, further promoting tourism and social interaction between the two societies.

Taiwan's ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), claims that the above mentioned trends have aided Taiwan's development over the past year, suggesting that it has helped the island achieve manufacturing goals and assisted in the realization of cross-strait harmony. The opposition raised a hue and cry arguing that this economic opening had substantially hollowed out Taiwan's manufacturing and high-tech industry and increased the disparity of wealth between rich and poor. Other critiques were also wary of sacrificing Taiwan's political autonomy and cultural identity by helping Beijing realize its known intention of further binding Taiwan to the Mainland. Given that Taiwan's media has indeed already taken up these talking-points on cross-strait relations, the clamor in the legislature has belatedly mimicked the media. Although intensive debates and queries were conducted on the issue, it would appear that the KMT still has control over the main direction of cross-strait policies.

Cross-strait issues are often presented in the media and in the legislature as a two-sided debate, with each side rigidly staking out its own position without the ability to compromise or provide any room for suggested alternatives. Indeed, on cross-strait debates parties rarely deviate from their positions, so that party positions ultimately end up deciding the preferences of cross-strait policies. The media or politicians rarely examine what other factors influence their citizens' positions and views of cross-strait relations.

In the midst of these debates, people's attitudes have been constantly overlooked. It is true that the media often draws on public opinion, but there is still a lack of

understanding as to the factors that affect public opinion in cross-strait policies in Taiwan. Given the fact that supporters of the main political parties will follow their party's preferences and positions, what are the views of those "independent" or "undecided" voters who are fence sitters supporting neither party? Furthermore, are there other factors that affect cross-strait attitudes apart from political rhetoric, such as socio-economic status, gender, or locality? In addition to the main issues (ECFA, Chinese tourists, and other related issues), what are citizens' attitudes toward other social issues in cross-strait affairs? The presentation of a perspicacious picture of the concrete factors influencing Taiwanese cross-strait relations and preferences cannot be adduced without understanding the complex issues governing Taiwanese responses.

Social differentiation and social cleavages have led to differences of positions and attitudes on cross-strait issues in Taiwan. Different social groups of gender, class, and party identification could well have different opinions about cross-strait policies. These attitudinal differences and their consequences not only reflect Taiwan's social differentiation and social cleavages, but also the social impact of China's rapid rise in the global economy and its powerful influence over cross-strait relations. Especially, since these cross-strait policies are at an initial stage in Taiwan, they will have lock-in effects on cross-strait institutional development. This is not just a single policy implementation without long term effects. On the contrary, cross-strait policies and people's opinions toward them will have significant effects on long-term institutional changes in cross-strait relations and domestic politics in Taiwan.

Data and Measurement

This study draws on data from two rounds of telephone survey conducted in 2010 in Taiwan. These surveys were part of a long term institutional research project, *Taiwan Social Trend Survey*, run by the Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica. The

interviewees were Taiwanese citizens over the age of eighteen. The first round survey was conducted on June 1-22, and consisted of 1,242 respondents (with a 95% confidence interval and a sampling error of $\pm 2.78\%$). The second round was conducted on December 16-26, and consisted of 1,238 respondents (with a 95% confidence interval and a sampling error of $\pm 2.78\%$).¹ Among questions in the first round of surveys were people's attitudes toward ECFA, recognizing Chinese university degrees, and accepting Chinese degree-seeking students on a full-time basis at Taiwanese universities. The second round of survey included questions of allowing independent Chinese individual tourists and increasing the daily quota of Chinese tourists into Taiwan.

More specifically, surveyed persons' attitudes toward five cross-strait issues were studied, with three issues from the first round survey and two issues from the second round. They are as follows.

- (1) Support or opposition for the signing of ECFA
- (2) Support or opposition to the recognition of Chinese university degrees
- (3) Support or opposition for allowing Chinese degree-seeking college students to study in Taiwan
- (4) Support or opposition for opening Taiwan to individual Chinese tourists, and
- (5) Support or opposition to increase the cap on the daily number of Chinese group tourists

What are the kinds of cross-strait relationship that the abovementioned issues referred to? For the ECFA question, it was the extent of mutual economic opening and trade ties with apparent economic implications. For Chinese tourists it was a question of social interaction and people-to-people exchange embodying substantive social

¹ For details regarding these two telephone surveys, see "Shehui yixiang diaocha zhixing baogao"(Reports on Social Image Survey, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, 2013.)

implications. On recognizing Chinese university degrees, it referred to “institutional acknowledgement,” a matter of acknowledging and accepting a different institution and system with somewhat greater political implications. Of course there could well be mixed considerations of individual respondents. For example, on relaxing restriction for Chinese tourism, in addition to considerations of social interaction and human contact, there could as well be economic considerations. However, at the fundamental level this would still fall under the original category of social interaction, for social interaction engenders economic effects. As far as the populace is concerned, attitudes with sentimental and instrumental motives are reasonable and common.

The descriptive statistics of people’s attitudes toward five cross-strait issues displayed the trends in their minds. In the categories of economic opening and cultural exchange, supporters outnumbered those who opposed the issue. On the ECFA issue, 45 % of respondents supported and 32% opposed (23% didn’t know or abstained from answering). On allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan, 50% supported the proposal while 45% were opposed to it (5% didn’t know or abstained from answering). Conversely, on institutional acknowledgement and social interaction questions, the opponents outnumbered supporters of these issues. On recognizing Chinese university degrees, 44% supported and 50% opposed the proposal. On opening Taiwan to individual Chinese tourists, 43% supported and 48% opposed the proposal. On increasing quotas for Chinese group tourists, 39% supported and 44% opposed the proposal.

[Table 1]

From the frequency distributions of the variables, it appears that Taiwanese people’s opinions on cross-strait relations’ policy issues were fractured. The majority of citizens supported economic openings and cultural exchanges, but another majority also opposed institutional acknowledgement and social interaction. On the issue of the

ECFA, support outweighed opposition by 13%, but a high percentage of people abstained from answering the issue (23%). Apart from this issue, the difference of opinion on other policy issues was less than 5%, indicating that there was no common meeting ground on these issues in Taiwan. A similar trend was detected in comparison with other surveys conducted in 2010 by the media or other organizations. On the question of ECFA and Chinese students attending Taiwanese universities, support outweighed opposition. However, on the question of recognition for China's university degrees, there was no clear trend of support or opposition.² For increasing the number of Chinese tourists, it seems most people supported a "slow opening" to Chinese individual tourists.³

In order to explain the differences of opinions on cross-strait policies, we considered the effects of the following variables: individual social positions, socioeconomic status, residential locality, party identification, preference for independence or reunification, and other factors (outlined in Appendix one). These variables are explained below:

(1) Individual social positions included gender, age, marital status, and ethnicity. Age referred to the age of the respondent on the year of the survey. Marital status was categorized as "not married" or married. Ethnicity was determined by the father's native place of birth and could be Taiwanese Minnan, Taiwanese Hakka, or

² For example, a telephone poll conducted on April 22, 2010 by the *China Times* showed that 47% Taiwanese supported Chinese students coming to Taiwan, but only 40% supported recognizing Chinese degrees (*China Times*, 2010/4/22). And on April 21-22, 2010, a TVBS telephone survey found that 51% Taiwanese supported accepting Chinese degree-seeking students to Taiwan but only 35% supported recognizing Chinese degrees (http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/yijung/201005/yijung-20100504120818.pdf).

³ A survey conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council on September 1-5, 2010 reported that 60% of the population supported a "slow opening" to Chinese individual tourists (<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/09211884354.pdf>)

Mainlander (there were too few Aboriginal respondents and thus they did not present themselves as a category)

(2) Socioeconomic status was indicated by education and income. Education was divided into three categories: junior high and under, high school, associate college and above. For income, this study was unable to set a common baseline because the first round survey asked for individual income and the second round asked for household income. There were fourteen income categories for both individual and household income, from no income to over NT\$200,000 per month

(3) Residential locality was coded into two categories for where respondents lived, namely in southern Taiwan (Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Pingdong) and elsewhere. This was meant to get a sense of the geographical difference between north and south Taiwan

(4) Party identification was measured from the questions the survey posed. From the question of “what party do you support: DPP, KMT, PFP, or TSU?” answers were divided into five categories: blue (KMT and PFP), green (DPP and TSU), those who chose candidates and not parties, those who supported both, and those who didn’t support any. In the analysis, we grouped together the answers “those who choose by candidate and those who supported both or none” as a category of “middle voters” that fell between blue and green

(5) National identity for independence or reunification was measured by the following questions. In the first round survey, the question asked was “do you support immediate reunification, immediate independence, or the status quo?” The answers were regrouped into four choices: reunification (including immediate reunification and maintaining status quo now but reunifying later), independence (including

immediate independence and maintaining status quo now but independence later). In the second round survey, the question was slightly different: “Given the state of cross-strait relations do you think it would be better for Taiwan in the future to be independent or to unify?” The answers were categorized as reunification, independence, and maintaining status quo

(6) Impact of ECFA on Taiwan’s wealth disparity: The original question was: “Do you think ECFA will increase, decrease, or have no impact upon Taiwan’s wealth disparity?” Answers were either increase, decrease, or had no impact

(7) ECFA considerations: The original questions was: “In cross-straits economic relationship, some people think that the Taiwanese economic position is most important, while others think that Taiwan’s sovereignty is most important. What do you think is most important? Answers were the economy, sovereignty, or both

(8) Impressions toward Chinese tourists. Three questions were asked to understand the impressions of Chinese tourists:

a) “After opening Taiwan to Chinese tourists what is your overall impression of China’s society: do you feel closer to China, further from China, or no different?” Answers were chosen from “closer than before,” “further than before,” or “no difference”

b) “Do you have some kinds of good impression on Chinese tourists in Taiwan?” Answers were recoded into two categories:

(i) “have a good impression (including behavior and attitude),

(ii)” and “do not have a good impression or no opinion?”

c) “Do you have some kind of bad impression on Chinese tourists in Taiwan?” Answers were “have a bad impression (including behavior and attitude),” and “do not have a bad impression or no opinion.”

Results

To examine the effects of various factors on different cross-strait policies, binary logistic regression models were used and presented as follows. Foremost, Table 2 shows the variables that may have influenced people’s support for ECFA, which will link to further economic opening and trade relations. In Model 1 through Model 5, the effects of various independent variables were quite consistent. For personal characteristics, the higher age (although the influences were not that significant in model four, still it was near the significance level of 0.05), education level, and individual income, the higher the support was for ECFA. Furthermore, mainlanders were more likely to support ECFA than Taiwanese Minnan people. Also, unmarried respondents had more support for ECFA than married ones. For party identification, those who supported the blues were more likely to support ECFA than those who supported the greens and those who were “middle voters.” On national identity, those who supported independence were less likely to support ECFA than those who supported reunification and maintaining the status quo. Similarly, on the issue of ECFA creating greater wealth disparity, those who thought ECFA would make the disparity greater were less likely to support ECFA than those who thought it would have no impact at all. Finally, those who thought that in cross-strait trade Taiwan’s economic advantage should be put first were more likely to support ECFA than those who thought sovereignty should be put first.

In conclusion, those who supported further opening cross-strait economy and

trade relations by means of ECFA were older citizens of a higher socioeconomic status (education and income) who supported the blues and opposed Taiwan's independence. Furthermore, other variables being equal, those who thought that ECFA would not influence wealth disparities and those who thought that in trade relations Taiwan's economic advantage should be given primacy were more likely to support ECFA.

[Table 2]

Second, for the issue of educational and cultural exchange, Table 3 presents binary logistic regression models to show the effects of various variables on the attitude toward permitting Chinese degree-seeking students to study in Taiwan. For personal characteristics, Model 1 shows that the higher the respondent's age, education, and individual income, the more likely they would support permitting Chinese students to study in Taiwan. Similarly, mainlanders were more likely to support such an opening than Taiwanese Minnan people. The second model shows that when combined with party identification, several factors such as education, individual income, and ethnicity (mainlanders versus Minnan) were still significant, but age became insignificant. At this stage, gender became a significant factor in which females more than males, tended to oppose permitting Chinese students. The insignificant effect of age implied that it was party identification rather than age that had influence on one's attitude for permitting Chinese students to study in Taiwan. Similarly, non-blue supporters (greens and "middle-voters") were more likely not to support permitting Chinese students than blues. In Model 3, the inclusion of variable of national identity (i.e., support for independence/unification) made the effect of ethnicity insignificant. Relative to those advocating the status quo, unification supporters were more likely to support permitting Chinese students, and independence supporters were more likely to oppose such a policy. Also, those unmarried were more

likely to support permitting Chinese students than those who were married. In model 4, those who emphasized Taiwan's economic advantage over sovereignty were more likely to support permitting Chinese students.

In conclusion, supporters of educational and cultural exchange in the form of permitting Chinese degree-seeking students exhibited these characteristics: male, higher socioeconomic status (education and income), blue-camp supporters, and pro-unification and anti-independence. Furthermore, they were more likely to give primacy to Taiwan's economic advantage over the country's political sovereignty. Conversely, females, people with lower socioeconomic status, green-camp supporters and middle voters, pro-independence supporters, and those who emphasized sovereignty over economic advantage, tended not to support allowing Chinese degree-seeking students into Taiwan.

[Table 3]

Third, on policies relating to institutional acknowledgement, Table 4 lays out the models for support for recognizing Chinese university degrees. From Model 1 to 4, the effects of variables are very consistent. Overall, from model 4, those who were males, mainlanders, elders, more educated, blue-camp supporters, pro-unification, and with higher incomes tended to support the recognition of Chinese university degrees. Also, those who gave primacy to economic advantage over national sovereignty were more likely to support recognition of Chinese university degrees.

In summary, the characteristics of those who supported recognition of Chinese university degrees were the following: older, high socioeconomic status, male, mainlanders, blue-camp supporters and pro-unification supporters. Furthermore, they were more likely to give primacy to the economy over sovereignty. Conversely, those who were younger, female, with lower socioeconomic status, non-blue supporters, pro-independence supporters, and with a primacy to sovereignty over economy were

more likely to oppose recognizing Chinese university degrees.

[Table 4]

Fourth, on the issues of cross-society interaction, Table 5 presents models for opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travelers. It shows that ethnicity (mainlander versus Taiwanese Minnan) as a factor did not negatively impact on support for opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travelers, and that difference was caused by party identification. Non-blue voters were more likely to oppose opening Taiwan than blue voters. Higher educated people were more likely to support opening Taiwan than lower educated people, as were those who were unmarried. However, women were more likely to oppose than males. People's feeling of relatedness to Chinese travelers, as well as their impression of good or bad Chinese tourists significantly influenced their responses to opening Taiwan. Those that felt closer and those who had a good impression on Chinese tourists were more likely to support further opening Taiwan in the long run.

[Table 5]

Lastly, on social interaction, Table 6 presents models for increasing Chinese tourist quota to Taiwan. Females were less likely to support such a policy, as were native Taiwanese Minnan people. Ethnicity was not a support or non-support factor, rather the case rested upon party identification. Non-blue voters were more likely than blue voters to oppose increasing visitors; those who supported independence were more likely to oppose increases than those who supported the status quo. The feeling of closeness to Chinese visitors and good and bad impressions also had an influence on support or non-support for increasing the quota of visitors. Those who had good impressions or felt closer to Chinese tourists were more likely to support an increasing quota of visitors; whereas those who had a bad impression were less likely to opt for a quota increase.

[Table 6]

Remarks

From the above analysis, it is clear that there are significant differences for various factors affecting people's attitudes towards the government's cross-strait policies, in which social differentiation and social cleavages have played a key role. Furthermore, these differences reflect how cross-strait policies and the rise of China have affected different social groups in Taiwan. These policies relate to different aspects of cross-strait interactions, including economic cooperation (ECFA), educational exchange (permitting Chinese degree-seeking students), institutional acknowledgment (recognizing Chinese university degrees), and social interactions (allowing more group and individual Chinese tourists into Taiwan). In personal background, the older the individual, as well as the higher his/her socioeconomic status, the more likely he/she was to support policies of increasing exchanges with China. This is also to say, the younger the individual and the lower his/her socioeconomic status, the more likely he/she was to oppose further interactions with China. In short, generation and socioeconomic status played a vital role in one's supporting or opposing cross-strait policies.

Table 7 is a breakdown of percentages of group support for the various cross-strait policies. These issues of analysis are: 1) ECFA; 2) permitting Chinese degree-seeking students; 3) recognizing Chinese university degrees; 4) opening to individual Chinese tourists; 5) increasing the daily quota for Chinese group tourists. The percentage of older respondents (over 42 years old) who supported these issues is: 1) 48%; 2) 51%; 3) 45%; 4) 45%; and 5) 40%. In comparison, the percentage of support among younger respondents (under 42 years old) is: 1) 42%; 2) 50%; 3) 43%; 4) 44%; and 5) 40%. From these figures it is apparent that overall older respondents

had higher levels of support for these policies than younger ones. At the same time, those with higher education were more likely to support these policies. The percentages in this category are: 58%, 61%, 55%, 54%, and 46% for those with more than a high school education; and 35%, 42%, 35%, 37%, and 35% for those with less than high school education.

[Table 7]

The so-called “southern Taiwan factor” does not, in fact, have any significant effect on people’s position on cross-strait policies. The category of mainlander is a significant variable when controlling other variables in light of people’s attitude towards economic opening with ECFA and institutional acknowledgment with recognizing Chinese degrees. For issues of permitting Chinese students and increasing the quotas of group tourists, when controlling for party identification and national identity, the mainlander effect disappeared.

On the surface, the influence of party identification on positions of cross-strait policies appears to accord with expectations. Green supporters had strong tendencies of opposing policies for greater interaction with China. But it is worth pointing out that green and blue support was not the entire spectrum of Taiwan political affiliation. Together, greens and blues only made up about 50% of the population (Blue 34%, Green 17%). What is the position towards cross-strait policies of the other half which does not have a strong party identification? Generally speaking, citizens of this other half were located directly in the middles of blues and greens. Given the equality of their personal backgrounds with regard to age, gender, socioeconomic status and ethnicity, middle voters who were neither blue nor green tended to show less support for cross-strait policies than blue supporters did.

Lastly, most ignored, but what should give us the most cause for pause is the impact of gender on support for cross-strait policies. This study found that a higher

percentage of Taiwanese women than men opposed the increasing amount of social exchanges with China. Women and men did not have many differences in their positions on economic issues, such as ECFA. However, when background factors such as marriage status and income were controlled, people's opinions on social issues were split by gender. These issues included cultural and educational exchanges, recognition of Chinese diplomas and social interaction.

Table 7 makes it apparent that male support of cross-strait policies is consistently higher than female support. The issues and corresponding figures for male and female are:

- 1) ECFA (48% vs. 44%)
- 2) permitting Chinese degree-seeking students (55% vs. 46%)
- 3) recognizing Chinese university degrees (49% vs. 40%)
- 4) open to individual tourists (50% vs. 39%)
- 5) increasing group tourist quota (47% vs. 33%)

When placing economic openings alongside other factors, gender was not imbalanced. However, for other issues, such as educational exchange, institutional acknowledgement, or social interaction, and after controlling for personal background (education, marriage, income, and ethnicity), females tended to oppose policies more than males did.

Tables 8 to Table 11 analyzed the relationship between gender, party identification, and each of the policies under consideration. Table 8 shows that for the issue of ECFA, gender was not a factor in support of the policy among blue and green voters. The ratio difference between male and female blue support voters was small (51% ; 49%).

Table 9 shows that for educational exchange issues, gender difference among non-blue voters was not significant. However, among blue voters, females clearly

opposed the policy of opening to Chinese relatively more than males did. Among the non-blue voters, opposition to the same policy was split between 49% of males and 51% of females. Conversely, among blue voters, 36% of males and 64% of females opposed the educational exchange issue. The same gender discrepancy exists among blue voters on the issues of recognizing Chinese university degrees and increasing the quota of Chinese tourists. In Table 10, gender difference was not obvious among non-blue voters over the issue of recognizing Chinese degrees. However, among blue voters 38% males opposed recognizing Chinese degrees, while 62 percent of females did. As for opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travelers, non-blue gender difference was negligible, but for blue voters 35% males and 65% females opposed this issue (Table 11). Similarly, 36% male blue voters opposed increasing group tourist quotas, while 64 percent of female blue voters did (table 12).

[Table 8-12]

From this analysis it is evident that Taiwan females took a different position on cross-strait policies than their male counterparts. On economic opening and trade, women were not that different from men. However, on non-economic policies, women were more likely to take an opposing position than men as for example on policies pertaining to institutional acknowledgement and social interaction. Why is this the case? We don't have a certain explanation yet, but a few working hypotheses are put forth. First, it may be about personal need for stability, particularly for stable homes and committed relationships. The issues of permitting Chinese students, recognizing Chinese degrees, and increasing group tourist quotas would have an immediate impact on people's living environment and social networks. For housewives or single women, such policies would have the potential to overturn or distort the predictability and stability of everyday life. These past twenty years have witnessed Taiwanese businessmen go off to China and send money back home to their

wives, who tended to feel alienated from marriage stability and a secure home environment which they value. Although only few women live in separated families due to husbands working in China, the impression of their insecurities and instabilities has been widely felt. Thus, women would more likely take a conservative position on such cross-strait interactions so as to keep it within the realm of predictability and stability. Second, it may reflect the gender differences in the ways that women and men politicize their respective cultural issues. For example, recent scholarship suggests that in the US men and women responded differently to cultural issues such as anti-war issues, civil rights, abortion rights, women's rights, and homosexual rights (Kaufmann 2002, 2006). In Taiwan, women care more about social issues than men (Yang 2006, Yang and Liu 2009). This may lead to their different attitudes toward cross-strait social policies. Thirdly, for Taiwanese women there exists a potential threat from Chinese mistresses. Even if Taiwan's economy benefits from ECFA, those who are making money and enjoying life are mostly men, but the brunt of the social interactions with China falls on women. For example, the Taiwanese media has recently made a roar of the "Chinese mistress" which has engendered further distrust among women on policies of cross-strait interactions, and led them to feel victimized in cross-strait social interactions. Many women do not see benefits accruing from further cross-strait social exchanges. In fact, they feel disadvantaged from such social exchanges and stand the possibility of losing. Finally, it may be related to concerns on the impact on the marriage market. Increasing social interaction with China would have the effect of stimulating the marriage market leaving unmarried Taiwanese women feeling that they are now in competition with Chinese women, placing the fear in the minds of the Taiwanese housewives that their young children may find a match with Chinese men or women on college campus. Perhaps as a result of these factors, the effects of party identification, socioeconomic status, age, and gender on social

policies remain independent and significant variables in today's Taiwanese society.

In Taiwan, the reservations about cross-strait policies for some social groups -- female, the younger generation, and people with the lower socioeconomic status -- explicitly reflect their collective concerns and anxiety about the surging "China impact," particularly after the acceleration of cross-strait exchanges after 2008. These social groups are economically vulnerable and relatively disadvantaged in this society. They seem uncomfortable and insecure in facing increasing social interactions with Chinese people to Taiwan, and this kind of collective anxiety did not exist in previous years before the acceleration of cross-strait exchanges after 2008. For example, studies on Taiwanese attitudes toward immigration policies for bride immigrants emanating from China and Southeast Asia have showed that in the early 2000s gender, age, and socioeconomic status had little effect on people's attitudes regarding immigration policies. During that period when cross-strait contacts were not so intensive and interactions not so frequent, people's attitudes regarding cross-strait policies were shaped mainly by partisan competition and political rhetoric, instead of socioeconomic status and self-interest (Chen and Yu 2005; Tsai 2011). However, when cross-strait exchanges accelerated and everyday life was relatively affected, people's attitudes altered reflecting their emotive feelings and interpretation of China's rising impact on civil society in Taiwan.

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Table 1 : Attitudes on cross strait policies in Taiwan

	N	%
Economic opening		
(1) Support signing ECFA ?		
Support	558	45
Not support	395	32
Don't know (abstained from answering)	289	23
Educational exchange		
(2) Support allowing Chinese students to study in Taiwan?		
Support	618	50
Not support	559	45
Don't know(abstained from answering)	65	5
Institutional acknowledgement		
(3) Support recognizing Chinese degrees?		
Support	541	44
Not support	623	50
Don't know(abstained from answering)	78	6
Social interaction		
(4) Support allowing individual Chinese tourists into Taiwan?		
Support	535	43
Don't support	597	48
Missing values	106	9
(5) Relax restrictions on number of Chinese group tourists to Taiwan?		
Support	477	39
Don't support	540	44
Don't know(abstained from answering)	221	18

Sources:

(1)-(3): The first round survey conducted in June 1-22, 2010.

(4)-(5): The second round conducted in December 16-26, 2010.

Table 2 : Factors influencing support for signing ECFA

Model	1		2		3		4		5	
	β		β		β		β		β	
Age	0.03	***	0.03	**	0.02	*	0.02		0.03	*
Education level (below junior high school)										
High school	0.79	**	0.81	**	0.76	*	0.88	**	0.82	*
Associate college and above	1.03	***	1.08	***	1.11	***	1.14	***	1.04	**
Female (Male)	0.21		0.10		0.11		0.05		-0.2	
Unmarried (married)	0.35		0.56	*	0.60	*	0.54		0.56	
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.2		0.25		0.27		0.31		0.31	
Average monthly income	0.11	***	0.11	**	0.11	**	0.13	**	0.16	***
Ethnicity (Fujian)										
Hakka	0.26		-0.1		-0.2		-0.1		-0.1	
Mainlander	1.74	***	1.17	***	1.02	**	1.15	**	1.20	**
Party affiliation (KMT)										
DPP			-4.2	***	-3.6	***	-3.3	***	-3.0	***
Choose candidate/policy			-1.9	***	-1.8	***	-1.4	***	-1.3	***
Support all			-1.7	***	-1.6	***	-1.3	**	-1.1	*
Support none			-2.1	***	-2.0	***	-1.7	***	-1.6	***
Tendency to support independence or reunification (maintain status quo)										
Reunification					0.37		0.35		0.23	
Independence					-1.3	***	-1.2	***	-0.1	***
Wait and see					-0.3		-0.4		-0.3	
ECFA rich-poor influence (No influence)										
Greater wealth disparity							-2.1	***	-2.1	***
Smaller wealth disparity							0.02		-0.1	
Emphasis on cross strait business negotiations (National sovereignty)										
Economic advantage									1.33	***
Economic sovereignty									0.46	
Intercept	-2.7	***	-0.8		-0.5		0.88		-0.4	
Chi-square	111	***	366	***	397	***	477	***	510	***
Df	9		13		16		18		20	
N	827		827		827		827		827	

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Note : Dependent variable: 1: "Support ECFA"; 0:"Don't support ECFA"

A variable in brackets refers to the reference group.

Table 3 : Factors influencing support for permitting Chinese students

Model	1		2		3		4	
	β		β		β		β	
Age	0.01	*	0.01		0.01		0.01	
Education level (below junior high school)								
High school	0.49	*	0.45	*	0.41		0.37	
Associate college and above	0.84	***	0.80	***	0.81	***	0.79	***
Female (Male)	-0.22		-0.32	*	-0.33	*	-0.42	**
Unmarried (married)	0.33		0.40		0.44	*	0.41	
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.11		0.10		0.13		0.12	
Average monthly income	0.09	***	0.08	**	0.08	**	0.08	*
Ethnicity (Fujian)								
Hakka	0.15		-0.07		-0.10		-0.10	
Mainlander	1.05	***	0.58	*	0.45		0.42	
Party affiliation (KMT)								
DPP			-2.44	***	-2.09	***	-1.94	***
Choose candidate/policy			-0.90	***	-0.74	***	-0.66	**
Support all			-0.50		-0.42		-0.30	
Support none			-1.05	***	-0.96	***	-0.91	***
Tendency to support independence or reunification (maintain status quo)								
Reunification					0.74	*	0.68	*
Independence					-0.74	***	-0.63	**
Wait and see					0.17		0.17	
ECFA rich-poor influence (No influence)								
Greater wealth disparity							0.58	***
Smaller wealth disparity							0.41	
Intercept	-1.63	***	-0.41		-0.43		-0.86	
Chi-square	94.9	***	225.3	***	254.7	***	266.3	***
Df	9		13		16		18	
N	1029		1029		1029		1029	

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Note : Dependent variable: 1: "Support the government opening Taiwan to Chinese students to come to study"; 0: "Do not support the government opening Taiwan to Chinese students to come to study". A variable in brackets refers to the reference group.

Table 4 : Factors influencing support for recognizing Chinese degrees

Model	1		2		3		4	
	β		β		β		β	
Age	0.02	**	0.02	*	0.02	*	0.02	**
Education level (below junior high school)								
High school	0.81	***	0.76	***	0.74	**	0.71	**
Associate college and above	1.11	***	1.06	***	1.10	***	1.07	***
Female (Male)	-0.25		-0.35	*	-0.33	*	-0.47	**
Unmarried (married)	0.27		0.33		0.35		0.32	
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.28		-0.10		-0.11		-0.11	
Average monthly income	0.09	***	0.09	**	0.08	**	0.08	*
Ethnicity (Fujian)								
Hakka	0.18		0.01		-0.01		0.00	
Mainlander	1.33	***	0.94	***	0.81	***	0.80	***
Party affiliation(KMT)								
DPP			-2.36	***	-2.01	***	-1.79	***
Choose candidate/policy			-0.93	***	-0.74	***	-0.63	**
Support all			-0.46		-0.37		-0.19	
Support none			-0.87	***	-0.74	***	-0.67	***
Tendency to support independence or reunification (maintain status quo)								
Reunification					1.16	***	1.09	***
Independence					-0.73	***	-0.55	*
Wait and see					0.06		0.06	
ECFA rich-poor influence (No influence)								
Greater wealth disparity							0.87	***
Smaller wealth disparity							0.48	
Intercept	-2.40	***	-1.34	**	-1.40	**	-2.11	***
Chi-square	132.5	***	247.3	***	283.5	***	308.3	***
Df	9		13		16		18	
N	1027		1027		1027		1027	

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Note : Dependent variable: 1: "Support the government recognizing Chinese degrees"; 0:"Oppose the government recognizing Chinese degrees". A variable in brackets refers to the reference group.

Table 5 : Factors supporting opening Taiwan to Chinese individual tourists

Model	1		2		3		4		5		6	
	β		β		β		β		β		β	
Age	0.0	***	0.0	**	0.0	**	0.0	**	0.0	**	0.0	*
Education (below junior high school)												
High school	0.5	*	0.4		0.4		0.4		0.5		0.5	
Associate college and above	0.9	***	0.8	**	0.8	**	0.8	**	0.9	***	1.0	***
Female (Male)	-0.3		-0.4	*	-0.3	*	-0.4	*	-0.4	*	-0.3	
Unmarried (married)	0.4		0.5	*	0.5	*	0.6	*	0.5	*	0.5	*
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.2		-0.1		0.0		-0.1		0.0		0.0	
Household income	0.1		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Ethnicity (Minnan)												
Hakka	0.3		0.3		0.2		0.3		0.2		0.2	
Mainlander	0.8	***	0.4		0.4		0.3		0.2		0.2	
Party affiliation (Blue)												
Green			-1.3	***	-1.0	***	-0.8	**	-0.6	*	-0.6	*
Choose candidate/policy			-0.9	***	-0.8	**	-0.7	**	-0.6	*	-0.5	
None			-0.6	**	-0.5	*	-0.3		-0.2		-0.2	
Unification or independence (status quo)												
Unification					0.7		0.6		0.6		0.7	
Independence					-0.8	***	-0.6	**	-0.6	*	-0.4	
Impressions to Chinese tourists												
Feel closer to China ^a (no)							0.9	***	0.8	***	0.8	***
Good impressions ^b (no)									0.8	***	0.8	***
Bad impressions ^c (no)											-0.7	***
Intercept	-2.3	***	-1.5	*	-1.5	**	-1.9	**	-2.1	***	-1.9	**
Chi-square	56		89		105		131		146		160	
Df	9		12		14		15		16		17	
N	671		671		671		671		671		671	

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Note: Dependent variable: 1: "Support opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travelers" ; 0: "Oppose opening Taiwan to individual Chinese travelers". A variable in brackets refers to the reference group.

a: After the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists, do you feel closer to China ?

b: Do you have a good impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan?

c: Do you have a bad impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan ?

Table 6 : Factors influencing increasing Chinese group tourist quotas

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
	β	β	β	β	β	β
Age	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Education (below junior high school)						
High school	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2
Associate college and above	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2
Female (Male)	-0.5 **	-0.6 ***	-0.6 ***	-0.7 ***	-0.7 ***	-0.7 ***
Unmarried (married)	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Southern Taiwan (other areas)	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Household income	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ethnicity (Minnan)						
Hakka	-0.1	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4
Mainlander	0.6 *	0.2	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Party affiliation (Blue)						
Green		-1.6 ***	-1.2 ***	-1.0 ***	-0.9 ***	-0.9 ***
Choose candidate/policy		-0.5 *	-0.5	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2
None		-0.8 ***	-0.7 ***	-0.5 *	-0.5 *	-0.5 *
Unification or independence (status quo)						
Unification			0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4
Independence			-0.9 ***	-0.8 **	-0.7 *	-0.6 *
Impressions to Chinese tourists						
Feel closer to China ^a (no)				1.0 ***	0.9 ***	0.9 ***
Good impressions ^b (no)					0.7 ***	0.8 ***
Bad impressions ^c (no)						-0.4 *
Intercept	-0.6	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.4
Chi-square	29	72	88	118	130	135
Df	9	12	14	15	16	17
N	621	621	621	621	621	621

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Note: Dependent variable: 1:"support to increase quotas"; 0:"quotas can decrease or remain the same."

A variable in brackets refers to the reference group.

a: After the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists, do you feel closer to China ?

b: Do you have a good impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan?

c: Do you have a bad impression of Chinese tourists in Taiwan ?

Table 7 : The cross tables of personal characteristics and cross-strait policies
(Percentages of the group number of respondents)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	ECFA (N=1185)	Allow Chinese students (N=1185)	Recognize Chinese degrees (N=1185)	Open to individual travelers (N=1143)	Increase group tourist quotas (N=1143)
Generation					
Young	42%	50%	43%	44%	40%
Old	48%	51%	45%	45%	40%
Education					
Below high school	35%	42%	35%	37%	35%
Associate college and above	58%	61%	55%	54%	46%
Gender					
Male	48%	55%	49%	50%	47%
Female	44%	46%	40%	39%	33%
Party affiliation					
Blue	77%	72%	65%	59%	58%
Middle	37%	47%	40%	41%	33%
Green	8%	19%	15%	26%	22%

Note:

- 1: The percentages show the support ones, and other items include “oppose,” and “don’t know” (abstained from answering).
- 2: Young generation refers to those born in 1968 and after. Old generation refers to those born in 1967 and before.
3. Blues include KMT and PFP. Greens include DPP and TSU.
4. Middle voters include those who voted for the candidate or policy and not the party, support all parties, or support no party.

Table 8 : The cross table of gender, party, and ECFA

		ECFA		
Party affiliation		support(N=280)	oppose(N=32)	total(N=312)
Blue	Male	51%	56%	52%
	Female	49%	44%	48%
		Support(N=198)	oppose(N=317)	total(N=515)
Non-blue	Male	56%	55%	56%
	Female	44%	45%	45%

Table 9 : The cross table of gender, party, and permitting Chinese students

		Permitting Chinese students		
Party affiliation		support(N=277)	oppose(N=92)	total(N=369)
Blue	Male	55%	36%	50%
	Female	45%	64%	50%
		support(N=274)	oppose(N=386)	total(N=660)
Non-blue	Male	54%	49%	51%
	Female	46%	51%	49%

Table 10 : The cross table of gender, party, and recognition of Chinese degrees

		Recognition of Chinese degrees		
Party affiliation		support(N=250)	oppose(N=113)	total(N=363)
Blue	Male	55%	38%	50%
	Female	45%	62%	50%
		support(N=233)	oppose(N=431)	total(N=664)
Non-blue	Male	56%	49%	52%
	Female	44%	51%	49%

Table 11 : The cross table of gender, party, and opening to individual travelers

		Opening to individual travelers		
Party affiliation		support(N=160)	oppose(N=88)	total(N=248)
Blue	Male	58%	35%	50%
	Female	43%	65%	50%
		support(N=162)	oppose(N=261)	total(N=423)
Non-blue	Male	53%	49%	50%
	Female	48%	51%	50%

Table 12 : The cross table of gender, party, and increasing Chinese group tourist quotas

		Increasing Chinese group tourist quotas		
Party affiliation		support(N=148)	oppose(N=89)	total(N=237)
Blue	Male	59%	36%	50%
	Female	41%	64%	50%
		support(N=141)	oppose(N=243)	total(N=384)
Non-blue	Male	56%	45%	49%
	Female	44%	55%	51%

Appendix 1 : Descriptive statistics

Variable name	First round 2010/06				Second round 2010/12			
	(N=1242)				(N=1238)			
	N	%	Mean	S.D.	N	%	Mean	S.D.
Age	1219	98	47	15	1188	96	48	15
Education								
Below junior high school	299	24			344	28		
High school	364	29			359	29		
Higher degree	575	46			530	43		
Gender								
Male	604	49			601	49		
Female	638	51			637	52		
Marriage status								
Married	964	78			994	80		
Unmarried	276	22			236	19		
Area								
Southern Taiwan	321	26			302	24		
Other areas	915	74			936	76		
Ethnicity								
Hakka	152	12			145	12		
Minnan	894	72			891	72		
Mainlander	170	14			170	14		
Missing values	26	2			32	3		
Individual/household monthly	1200	97	5.0	2.8	973	79	7.5	3.5
Income			(3~4,000 NT dollars)				(5~6,000 NT dollars)	
Missing values	42	3			265	21		
Party affiliation								
Blue	416	34			416	34		
Green	207	17			206	17		
Choose candidate (or policy)	202	16			204	17		
Support all	49	4						
Support none	333	27			365	30		
Missing values	35	3			47	4		

Appendix 1 : Descriptive statistics (continued)

Variable	First round 2010/06		Second round 2010/12	
	(N=1242)		(N=1238)	
	N	%	N	%
Unification or independence sentiment ⁴				
Unification	111	9	206	17
Independence	253	20	77	6
Depends on situation	463	37		
Maintain status quo	348	28	858	69
Missing values	67	5	97	8
Do you think the signing of the ECFA will increase wealth disparity in Taiwan, decrease it, or not have any impact?				
Increase	632	51		
Decrease	78	6		
No influence	246	20		
Missing values	193	16		
In cross strait economic interaction what do you think it most important, Taiwan's economic advantage, Taiwan's sovereignty, or both are equally important?				
Economic advantage	665	54		
National sovereignty	391	32		
Both are important	137	11		
Missing values	49	4		
After the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists, how do you feel about Chinese society: closer, more distant, or no different?				
Yes			457	37
No			667	54
Missing values			114	9

⁴ There was a discrepancy in the questions of the two different rounds of interviews. See text for discussion.

Appendix 1 : Descriptive statistics (continue)

Variable	First round 2010/06		Second round 2010/12	
	N	%	N	%
Do you have a good impression of Chinese tourists?				
Yes			301	24
No			721	58
Missing values			216	17
Do you have a bad impression of Chinese tourists?				
Yes			482	39
No			614	50
Missing values			142	12

Note: "Missing values" include those who didn't know how to respond, abstained from answering, evaded the question, had no opinion, or gave some other answer that could not be categorized.